Abstract This paper analyzes, in a simple two-region model, the undertaking of noxious facilities when the central government has limited prerogatives. The central government decides whether to construct a noxious facility in one of the regions, and how to finance it. We study this problem under both full and asymmetric information on the damage caused by the noxious facility in the host region. We particularly emphasize the role of the central government prerogatives on the optimal allocations. We finally discuss our results with respect to the previous literature on NIMBY and argue that taking into account these limited prerogatives is indeed important.
Introduction
For most jurisdictional authorities, the construction of noxious facilities [e.g., airports, prisons, and waste disposals] is usually problematic. Such facilities produce M. Besfamille ( ) Department of Economics, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Alte. Saenz Valiente 1010, C1428BIJ, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina e-mail: mbesfamille@utdt.edu J.-M. Lozachmeur Toulouse School of Economics (CNRS-GREMAQ and IDEI), 21, Allée de Brienne, 31000, Toulouse, France e-mail: jean-marie.lozachmeur@univ-tlse1.fr important benefits for the jurisdiction as a whole, while their costs are mainly concentrated in the host locality. Therefore, localities oppose to host noxious facilities, generating what is commonly known as the "NIMBY" syndrome. 1 An important strand of literature analyzes NIMBY as a problem of asymmetric information, assuming that localities possess more information than the jurisdictional authority. Under these circumstances, localities use their private information strategically to induce the jurisdictional authority to make a decision that favors them. 2 This literature presents different mechanisms to fill this informational gap, like auctions, insurance devices, and incentive-compatible monetary compensations.
We depart from this previous literature in the following important aspect: the prerogatives that jurisdictional authorities have when they decide upon the construction of a noxious facility. The previous literature adopts extreme assumptions concerning these prerogatives. On the one hand, some contributions assume that the jurisdictional authority is obliged to respect the localities' status quo (i.e., their welfare when the noxious facility is not constructed) or their autonomy (i.e., the level of welfare when each locality constructs the noxious facility by itself). Formally, the mechanisms designed to elicit the localities' private information should include some kind of ex-ante, interim, or ex-post "participation constraint". On the other hand, other authors assume that the jurisdictional authority is endowed with unlimited powers to implement its preferred policy. Under this different institutional framework, the mechanisms need to verify no participation constraint.
In fact, these assumptions are not adequate for a general analysis of NIMBY. Although jurisdictional authorities do have prerogatives regarding the construction of noxious facilities, these prerogatives are usually limited. On the one hand, a jurisdictional authority is not always obliged to respect the status quo of all localities; 3 it can indeed force them to participate in the siting procedure. But, on the other hand, a jurisdictional authority cannot impose any decision to the host locality. The former is often constitutionally compelled to ensure the latter with a minimum level of welfare. The following example concerning a federal noxious facility in the US illustrates these assertions. Provided the choice of the site has followed the legal procedures, the US congress has the last word about the construction of a federal noxious facility, no matter the reaction at the state or at the local level. 4 Moreover, if the land on which the noxious facility will sit is not owned by the federal government (but, for example, by a state or a locality), the federal government can exercise the power of "eminent domain" to expropriate it. But there is a limit to such power. When intergovernmental takings occur, federal courts require the federal government to compel to the Takings
